The Irish peace process is wrongly used to suggest that talking to terrorists always works, according to a new book by two Cambridge academics.

The success the British government achieved by talking to Provisional IRA leaders in the early 1990s doesn’t mean that talking to al-Qaeda, Hamas, or republican dissidents would work, they argue.

‘Talking to terrorists’ by Belfast-born Cambridge lecturer Dr John Bew, Martin Frampton, and Basque journalist Inigo Gurruchaga, will be published later this year. It argues that key changes within both the Provisional movement and Irish society meant the IRA was ready to compromise.

But, in other situations, negotiating with armed groups could encourage them in the use of violence and undermine moderate political rivals. Bew said: “It’s fashionable to say, ‘it’s good to talk’. It’s a hard proposition to argue against.

“Our position isn’t necessarily hawkish – we’re just pointing out it can sometimes do governments more harm than good.” Tony Blair’s chief negotiator in the North, Jonathan Powell, and former Tory minister, Michael Ancram, have called for dialogue with Islamic militants.

The North’s Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Orde, has urged talks with al-Qaeda and, in last week’s Sunday Tribune, Assistant Chief Constable Peter Sheridan called for talks with dissident republicans.

Bew said: “I don’t think al-Qaeda nor dissidents would have any interest in such talks. They seem to have undergone no ideological revisionism and remain committed to fundamentalist objectives. Sinn Fein had limited support at the polls but neither of these groups has any democratic mandate.”

Bew acknowledged that with 45% support, violence hadn’t damaged Hamas electorally
but he warned of the dangers of talking to militants who believed they were “riding the crest of a wave”. Talking to the IRA in 1972 had been disastrous, he said: “IRA figures were flown to London to meet senior British politicians.

“They simply read out a prepared statement demanding a British withdrawal. The talks strengthened the IRA’s belief that its violence had forced the British to the negotiating table and another push would move the British in the direction of IRA objectives. The Bloody Friday bombs, killing nine people, followed the talks.”

The negotiations between republicans and the British in the early 1990s occurred in completely different conditions, he said. The IRA had been seriously weakened through infiltration by informers and was increasingly “militarily contained by the security services”.

The armed struggle was curtailing Sinn Fein’s political ambitions – the party had no MPs - whereas Hamas’s violence is electorally popular. The IRA leadership was prepared to compromise by accepting a settlement which didn’t include the destruction of the Northern state, whereas Hamas remains committed to the destruction of Israel, Bew said.